State-Owned Enterprises:
Big assets but missing numbers

IFI-AUB report maps and evaluates, but does not valuate

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) represent some of the country’s most strategic economic assets, spanning electricity, telecommunications, ports, airports, water, transport, gaming, tobacco, aviation, and prime real estate. Yet despite their scale and importance, a clear answer is lacking to a basic question: “What are these assets actually worth?”

A research report published this week by the American University of Beirut – Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) sheds light on why that question remains unanswered. The 'Lebanon’s State-Owned Enterprises: What We Know About Them' report does not attempt to value public assets in monetary terms. Instead, it explains why such a valuation has so far been impossible, and what must change before it can be done credibly.

The comprehensive report, authored by IFI Associate Fellows Sami Geadah, Sarah Borgi, and Nizar Bou Karroum, is the first study of its kind to be published.

Assets without a balance sheet
According to the report, Lebanon’s SOEs were never managed as a coherent portfolio. Many were inherited from the Ottoman era, absorbed during the French Mandate, or nationalized following private-sector failures, rather than established as part of a deliberate ownership strategy. Over time, they evolved into a mix of commercial enterprises and public utilities, often tasked simultaneously with generating revenue, providing social services, and absorbing employment.

Most SOEs do not publish audited financial statements. With the exception of Middle East Airlines, balance sheets and income statements are incomplete or unavailable, even to policymakers responsible for economic decision-making. As a result, any attempt to calculate the net worth of public assets would be, at best, speculative.

Fragmented signals of value
The report avoids formal valuation but does point to indicative signals of economic significance.

Telecommunications, for example, were once among the State’s largest revenue generators, with annual transfers to the treasury peaking at around $2 billion in 2014. External estimates cited in the report had previously placed the combined value of the two mobile operators at $6 billion to $8 billion before the financial crisis.

The Port of Beirut, situated on prime waterfront land, was estimated in 2020 to sit on real estate worth between $5 billion and $10 billion. Beirut Airport, meanwhile, has historically generated over $100 million annually for the treasury, while ports, the Casino, and monopolies such as the tobacco Régie continue to generate cash flows even amid crisis.

Asset turned into a liability
On the other side of the ledger, Electricité du Liban (EDL) stands out as a cautionary tale. Rather than an asset, it has functioned as a major fiscal liability, with cumulative government transfers estimated at $24 billion since the early 1990s, or more than $40 billion when interest costs are included. The report highlights EDL as one of the largest contributors to the public debt buildup.

Why valuation comes later, not first
The report said: “Valuation must follow reform, not precede it.” Pricing policies, governance structures, staffing levels, and regulatory oversight across SOEs are deeply distorted. In many cases, tariffs have been set for political reasons, costs are poorly tracked, and enterprises perform quasi-fiscal functions that blur the line between commercial and social objectives.

Under such conditions, assigning a price tag to State assets risks misleading both policymakers and the public. The report positions itself as groundwork of mapping what exists, how it operates, and where the information gaps lie, before any serious discussion of monetization, privatization, or public-private partnerships can take place.

From hidden burden to visible opportunity
The study ultimately reframes the SOE debate. Public assets are neither a silver bullet for the financial crisis nor a lost cause. They are underperforming, opaque, and politically constrained, but potentially valuable. The opportunity lies not in rushing to sell assets, but in first making them visible: audited accounts, transparent governance, professional boards, and clear mandates. Only then can the country determine which assets should remain public, which could be partnered with the private sector, and which could be monetized responsibly.

Until that happens, State-owned enterprises will remain paradoxical: Large enough to matter, yet insufficiently measured to count.